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A g n i e s z k a  S o l s k a
Garden path sentences 
in a relevance-theoretic perspective 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the interpretation process of the 
garden path sentences, such as (1) – (5), in the light of Sperber and Wilson’s 
(1986/1995) Relevance Theory and to demonstrate the potential this prima-
rily pragmatic framework has for explaining the processing failure caused by 
factors that are linguistic rather than pragmatic in nature. 
(1) The horse raced past the barn fell.
 i.e. The horse which was raced [by someone] past the barn fell [down].
(2) While the man hunted the deer ran into the woods.
 i.e. The deer ran into the woods, while the man hunted.
(3) I convinced her children are noisy.
 i.e. I convinced her that children are noisy.
(4) Mary gave the child the dog bit a bandage.
 i.e. Mary gave a bandage to the child whom the dog bit.
(5) The old man the boat.
 i.e. The boat is manned by the old people.
Resorting to a colloquial expression one can say that the misleading 
sentences above lead the addressee ‘down the garden path,’ i.e. they invite 
him to consider one parse, hence one interpretation, and then force him 
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to abandon this parse in favour of another. For instance, confronted with 
the classic example in (1), the hearer or reader begins by treating the word 
raced as an intransitive past tense verb functioning as the main verb of the 
sentence but he stumbles when he reaches the word fell. This apparently 
subjectless verb may cause some readers to reject the sentence as ungram-
matical. Most readers however will backtrack, revise the hypothesis they 
have initially made about the structure of the sentence, and reanalyze fell 
as its main verb and the fragment raced past the barn as a reduced relative 
clause modifying the noun horse.
2. The relevance-theoretic model of utterance comprehension
In the relevance-theoretic model of human communication and cogni-
tion, a cognitive stimulus, be it a sight, a sound, a memory or an utterance, 
is seen as more or less relevant to an individual depending on how many ef-
fects it yields in the individual’s cognitive system and how much effort the 
individual needs to exert while deriving those effects. This idea is captured 
in the so-called Cognitive Principle of Relevance, presented in (6): 
(6) Cognitive Principle of Relevance (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 260):
 Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximization of rele-
vance.
What makes utterances used in verbal communication different from 
other kinds of cognitive stimuli is their ostensive character, i.e. the fact that 
they are intentional and the overt demand they make on the addressee’s at-
tention guarantees to the addressee that what is being said is going to be op-
timally rather than maximally relevant to him. This notion is expressed in 
the so-called Communicative Principle of Relevance presented in (7), with 
the key concept of the presumption of optimal relevance given in (8). 
(7) Communicative Principle of Relevance (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 260): 
 Every act of ostensive communication conveys a presumption of its 
own optimal relevance.
(8) Presumption of optimal relevance (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 270): 
 (a) The ostensive stimulus is relevant enough for it to be worth the ad-
dressee’s effort to process it.
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 (b) The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one compatible with 
the communicator’s abilities and preferences.
Formulated in such terms, the Communicative Principle of Relevance 
is a criterion which, on the one hand, regulates the sort of utterances speak-
ers produce and, on the other hand, determines which interpretations of 
an utterance hearers will accept or reject. Interpreting verbal inputs is thus 
seen as a process automatically triggered by every utterance. It begins with 
the decoding phase, i.e. with the recovery of a linguistically encoded mean-
ing, which provides input to the inferential phase, which in turn involves the 
construction of a range of hypotheses about the explicit content of the utter-
ance, or its explicatures(s), and about the implicitely communicated mean-
ings, or implicatures. In deriving these meanings language users follow a sin-
gle general comprehension procedure, i.e. they follow a path of least effort 
in computing cognitive effects, they test hypotheses as they become availa-
ble to them and stop as soon as their expectations of relevance are satisfied 
(Wilson 2000: 420–421).
I would like to demonstrate that the relevance-theoretic model has 
the explanatory power to predict a range of phenomena connected not 
only with the processes of comprehending the garden path sentences but 
also with their very existence. There are three claims I hope to substan-
tiate here: 
First, that the Relevance Theory can predict the high degree of failure  —
in understanding the garden path sentences.
Second, that it can explain why the garden path sentences are relative- —
ly rare in discourse.
Third, that it can predict why the untenable interpretations are someti- —
mes the first to access thus triggering the garden path effect.
3. Predicting processing failure
The high degree of processing failure follows directly from the Cogni-
tive Principle of Relevance. Any structure which forces the comprehender 
to backtrack and search for a correction of previously taken assumptions is 
bound to increase the cost of achieving cognitive effects, and is thus less rel-
evant. In addition, since the information load of a garden path sentence is 
no different from that of its unambiguous paraphrase, the extra cost expend-
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ed is not outweighed by any communicative gains, which pushes the rele-
vance further down and increases the risk of communication breakdown. 
Naturally, as the actual balance of cost and effect will be different for differ-
ent speakers, some will be more, some less likely to flesh out the intended 
meaning or to fail in an attempt to do so. 
This prediction finds confirmation in empirical research which revealed 
that in many cases the process of reanalyzing garden path sentences is only 
partially successful. The experiments conducted by Christianson, Holling-
worth, Halliwell and Ferreira (2001) show that even after the reanalysis of 
the controversial structure such as (2) many readers continue to believe 
that the man hunted the deer although such a belief is not supported by 
the actual content of the utterance. The conclusion the researchers draw is 
that the process of natural language understanding is not an ‘all-or-noth-
ing proposition’ and that instead of producing complete and detailed rep-
resentations cognitive systems actually produce representations which, as 
they put it, are ‘good enough.’ This phenomenon of incomplete reanalysis 
is in keeping with the Communicative Principle of Relevance, which pre-
dicts that utterance comprehension is not geared towards deriving the best 
possible interpretation but the optimal one. It also confirms the notion 
that verbal understanding proceeds in the way outlined by the relevance-
theoretic comprehension procedure. The moment the comprehender con-
structs an interpretation of the sentence that seems tenable (even though 
in reality it is unlicensed by the input), he judges that processing has been 
successful and that further operations are not necessary. 
4. What makes garden path sentences relatively rare 
Naturally, the increased risk of communicative failure alone does not ex-
plain why garden path structures are rare in discourse. After all, language is 
rife with effort-demanding constructs, such as puns, ironies, creative meta-
phors, jokes, long convoluted constructions or texts saturated with low-fre-
quency lexical items. The very existence of such constructs seems to defy 
the notion that in making a choice as to which linguistic elements should 
be encoded speakers try to keep the hearer’s processing effort down. How-
ever, though increasing the risk of communication breakdown, the costly 
constructs I have just mentioned convey a whole host of meanings which 
offset this risk. This is what makes them drastically different from garden 
209Garden path sentences in a relevance-theoretic perspective
path sentences. Like other ostensive stimuli, garden path constructions au-
tomatically trigger the comprehension process. The language user assumes 
that they will be optimally relevant to him and continues to work on them 
in spite of initial difficulties. However, unlike most other effort-demanding 
structures, garden path structures frustrate those initial expectations of rel-
evance. No special communicative gains await the comprehender who has 
been able to provide the correct analysis, except maybe the sense of amuse-
ment or satisfaction at having solved a little linguistic puzzle. 
Why are garden path utterances used at all? Characteristically, they tend 
to appear in situations that have little to do with natural language use. They 
are used as test material in experiments conducted by psychologists or psy-
cholinguists who wish to gain insight into natural language processing or 
by scientists interested in designing computer programs that can emulate 
the linguistic capabilities of human language users. Occasionally they are 
used by teachers to test the level of linguistic command achieved by their 
students. Hardly ever are they found in spoken discourse, where pauses and 
tonic stress would normally indicate how constituents within a sentence are 
grouped. One is more likely to encounter them in works of fiction or poetry, 
i.e. in modes of discourse where confusing the reader is sometimes a virtue 
but in such cases it is never clear whether they are the result of careful de-
sign or of accident. For example, the baffling fragment of the novel Behind 
the Scenes at the Museum by K. Atkinson (1995: 11), given in (9a), would 
not be baffling at all, if a disambiguating comma had been inserted after the 
word being, as was done in (9b).
(9a) At the moment at which I moved from nothingness into being my 
mother was pretending to be asleep—as she often does at such mo-
ments.
(9b) At the moment at which I moved from nothingness into being, my 
mother was pretending to be asleep—as she often does at such mo-
ments.
Given the settings in which garden path sentences can be encountered, 
it is hardly surprising that when writing this paper I felt much more com-
fortable using such expressions as ‘comprehender’ or ‘language user’ instead 
of a more typical ‘hearer’ or ‘addressee.’
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5. Possible sources of the garden path effect
5.1. Local ambiguities
Let us now turn to the question of what triggers the garden path effect. 
The difficulty hearers have in processing garden path structures is often due 
to some local ambiguity in the grammatical structure, i.e. a place of indeter-
minacy, a cut off point supporting more than one interpretation only one of 
which will turn out tenable. Thus sentence (1) is locally ambiguous between 
the main clause reading and the relative clause complex noun phrase read-
ing. In (2) the fronted subordinate clause creates a place of indeterminacy 
in which an noun phrase can be given either an object or a subject reading. 
Sentence (3) is locally ambiguous as to what constitutes the complement of 
the verb convinced. In sentence (4) the local ambiguity focuses on the dou-
ble object and in (5) the garden path effect arises due to the lexical ambigu-
ity of two elements.
At first it would seem that sentences containing local ambiguities should 
be easier to process than the ones containing global ambiguities, since the 
ambiguity is cleared up once the whole sentence has been heard or read, 
thus leaving the hearer with one relevant interpretation. However, this is 
not the case with garden path sentences. Of the two interpretations local-
ly available, addressees typically choose the one which will ultimately turn 
out to be incorrect. 
5.2. The Principle of Late Closure 
and Theta Reanalysis Constraint 
As to why this happens, one possible explanation has been suggested 
by Frazier and Fodor (1978) or Frazier and Rayner (1982). In their discus-
sion of sentences such as the one about the hunter and the deer, they invoke 
the Principle of Late Closure, according to which when allowed by syntax, 
incoming material is attached inside the clause or phrase currently being 
processed.
The principle thus prevents the noun phrase the deer in sentence (2) 
from being attached outside the subordinate clause as this would lead to 
the early closure of the clause, i.e. the argument structure of the subordinate 
verb would get closed off despite the fact that the input string contains an 
apparently compatible object. However, as shown in Table 1, though the 
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principle seems to work for sentences (2), (3) and (5), it cannot account 
for examples such as (1), or (4), where the garden path effect (GPE) aris-
es due to the early closure (EC) rather than late closure (LC) of a clause 
currently processed.
Table 1. Late closure and the garden path effect
LATE CLOSURE 
LEADING TO GPE:
(2) While the man hunted EC the deer LC ran into the woods.
(3) I convinced her EC children LC are noisy.
(5) The old EC man LC the boat.
LATE CLOSURE NOT 
LEADING TO GPE:
(1) The horse EC raced past the barn LC fell.
(4) Mary gave the child EC the dog bit LC a bandage.
Another way of accounting for the interpretation difficulties readers en-
counter while parsing garden path sentences is proposed by Pritchett (1992: 
15) in the form of the Theta Reanalysis Constraint, which holds that ‘seman-
tic reanalysis which reinterprets a theta-marked constituent as outside of 
a current theta domain is costly.’ 
On this proposal, during the process of reanalysis of sentence (1), the 
AGENT noun phrase the horse must be removed from the theta-domain 
of the predicator raced into the domain of the predicator fell, which is 
costly, since it violates the constraint. In (2), the NP the deer has to move 
out from the theta-domain of the predicator hunted to the domain of the 
predicator ran and its role changes from PATIENT to AGENT. In sentence 
(3) the GOAL of the predicator convinced is restructured in such a way 
that the pronoun her remains in the theta-domain of convinced while the 
noun children is removed from this domain into the domain of are noisy, 
where it assumes the role of AGENT. In (4) the string the dog moves out 
of the domain of give into the domain of the verb bit. In (5), as a result of 
a thematic restructuring, the word old becomes the head of the NP and 
the word train becomes the predictor. 
The problem with both these frameworks is that they cannot explain 
why not all sentences containing local ambiguities trigger the garden path 
effect. For instance, sentences (10)–(14), modelled on the examples under 
analysis, do not seem to entrap the hearer in the processing failure even 
though they have exactly the same syntactic structures, the same set of 
theta domains, and sometimes even the same or at least similar ambigu-
ous items as their garden path counterparts.
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(10) The horse raced at the Belmont died.
(11) While the man hunted a meteorite crashed into the woods.
(12) I convinced her viruses are dangerous.
(13) Mary gave the child lightning scared a hug.
(14) The old rock the boat.
5.3. A relevance-theoretic account
I believe that a more promising account of what leads to the garden path 
effect can be found in the relevance-theoretic idea that words and phrases 
may encode concepts which become activated in the comprehender’s mind 
providing access to three types of information: (i) lexical (i.e. information 
about the natural language counterpart of the concept), (ii) logical (consist-
ing of a set of deductive rules which apply to logical forms of which that con-
cept is a constituent) and (iii) encyclopaedic (i.e. information about the ob-
jects, events and/or properties that instantiate it). In the process of utterance 
comprehension we draw from the encyclopaedic and possibly from the log-
ical entries of the concepts which serve as raw material for the logical form 
we are trying to construct. 
So what information is made accessible to us by such words as hunted, 
raced, convinced or gave? What might be the difference between the inferenc-
es drawn from the encyclopaedic entries of such concepts as the deer as op-
posed to a meteorite, the barn as opposed to the Belmont, the dog as opposed 
to lightning? Finally, why is the comprehender of sentence (5) more likely to 
access the complex concept of the old man than man the boat? 
Concerning sentences (1) and (10), unlike the phrase at the barn, the 
phrase at the Belmont can give access to information connected with a horse-
racing event at which horses do not merely race but are raced against each 
other, which is why the locally ambiguous sentence (10) is unproblematic 
while sentence (1) triggers the garden path effect. 
As for sentences (2) and (11), it may be observed that only the encyclo-
paedic entry for deer, but not for meteorite, contains information about be-
ing a potential quarry in a hunt. This may account for comprehenders mak-
ing plausible yet wrong assumptions about the deer being hunted, which in 
turn leads to the garden path effect in (2), but not in (11).
The phrase her children in sentence (3) makes a more likely candidate 
for being the GOAL of the predicator convinced than the phrase her virus-
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es in sentence (12). Besides women having children is part of our encyclo-
paedic knowledge of the word, hence the string her children is more likely 
to form a complex concept than the string her viruses. This may account for 
the garden path effect in (3) and the absence thereof in (12).
The gifts people get include dogs, but not atmospheric phenomena, 
hence the string give the child the dog in sentence (4) is more likely to be 
treated as a legitimate set of ordered concepts than the string give the child 
lightning in sentence (13).
Finally, both the old man and the old rock form tenable concepts. How-
ever, the string rock the boat in sentence (5) is more of a collocation than 
the string man the boat in (14), which makes the former more likely to be 
interpreted as a verb phrase, which in turn precludes the garden path effect 
in (14) and triggers it in (5).
As can be seen, in drawing inferences based on contextual assumptions 
made accessible by the encyclopedic entry of the linguistically encoded con-
cept, the comprehender is guided by his expectations of relevance. However, 
the inferential processes which normally help resolve interpreting difficul-
ties in some cases may lead him astray and hamper the correct understand-
ing of a sentence.
6. Concluding remarks 
I realize that in this paper I have only scratched the surface of the gar-
den path phenomenon. I do hope, however, that I have gone some way to-
wards demonstrating the predictive powers of the Relevance Theory in 
explaining why the normal automatic smooth process of linguistic com-
munication is sometimes doomed to go awry.
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